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Abstract   Transferable allowance management systems are receiving increased
attention from fishery managers and stakeholders alike. We use a laboratory ex-
periment in which human subjects play the role of fishers to evaluate the
promised economic efficiency of tradable allowance systems. In an experiment
designed to parallel the most common rules for trading allowances, we find that
allowance prices are only weakly associated with the value of the fishing right it
provides. Instead, we find a high degree of price variability, consistent with field
experiences. In the lab, this variability hampers convergence and supports
speculation, leading to average prices much higher than the equilibrium value
of allowances. During this protracted price discovery, allowances are
misallocated and efficiency falls. Modifications to the market institutions used
in most tradable allowance systems to improve price discovery and enhance effi-
ciency are discussed.
Key words   Fishery management, ITQs, tradable fishing rights, transferable al-
lowances, experiments, asset markets.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, Q28, G12.
Introduction
Tradable allowance systems are being increasingly applied to address numerous en-
vironmental and natural resource management problems, including water use,
pollution, and overfishing (Tietenberg 2002). In a typical application of tradable al-
lowances, a management authority sets an allowable level of activity, allocates
allowances to that level among users, and permits users to trade, or otherwise trans-
fer, their allocations. This establishes a market for an entirely new asset, which can
be extremely valuable and constitute a significant portion of the wealth or assets of
the stakeholders, particularly in water and fishing applications where stakeholders
are often small or family businesses. Research on the design of institutions for trad-
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ing water and pollution rights has greatly improved the performance of these institu-
tions. However, there is no published research on the design of the institutions that
are used for trading fishing allowances. This paper aims to begin to fill this gap in
knowledge.
In fishery management, tradable allowance management includes tradable crab
and lobster traps, tradable days-at-sea, and the most common, individual transfer-
able quotas (ITQs). Like other cap-and-trade systems, in each of these tradable
allowance systems, fishery managers determine a total amount of effort (traps or
days-at-sea) or landings (quota) allowed, allocate it among fishery participants, and
permit them to trade their allocations. According to the most recent review of expe-
riences with tradable fishing allowance programs, ITQ programs have been applied
to manage hundreds of fish stocks globally (Arnason 2002). At least seven major
fishing countries use ITQs as a principal component of their fisheries management
systems.1 Arnason (2002) estimates that “over 10% of the global ocean fish harvest
is currently taken under ITQs.”
The spread of tradable fishing allowance programs, which began with the adop-
tion of 200-mile exclusive economic zones in the 1970s, is due in large part to the
comparative advantages of these rights-based systems. Relative to traditional man-
agement measures, ITQs have a proven record of more effectively constraining
exploitation within set limits, mitigating the race-to-fish, reducing overcapacity and
gear conflicts, while improving product quality and availability. Producers and con-
sumers benefit from ITQs, and, when the resource rent is used to pay for the cost of
management, the general public benefits (Arnason 2002; NRC 1999; OECD 1997;
Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell 1995; Sutinen and Soboil 2003).
There are other appealing attributes of ITQs as well. Quota markets relieve
managers of most allocation decisions and allow them to devote their time and re-
sources to conservation decisions. ITQs provide fishers with the flexibility to scale
their operations to a level that best suits them. Another appealing feature is that
quota markets value the right to fish, which provides fishers with greater security
for retirement than currently exists. The approach creates an incentive to leave the
fishery and to sell quota to new entrants. Fishers also appreciate the opportunity to
value explicitly their fishing skills, and the liberation from command-and-control
regulation, which can be unpredictable. Some environmental groups support ITQs
because of the environmental and ecosystem benefits that result from the reduction
in fishing effort.
Despite the many advantages of ITQs, there are numerous concerns about the
overall merits of these tradable allowance programs. One principal concern is con-
centration of ownership; that a few large operators will control the quota (or other
allowance) and small operators will be pushed out of the fishery. Another concern is
that ITQs will harm the coastal communities that depend on numerous small-scale
fishing operations (NRC 1999). Some fishers and managers find such programs
threatening and risky because of previous experiences with high levels of price vola-
tility (Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr forthcoming; Larkin and Milon 2000). They are
anxious about how they and their fisheries will be affected by unfamiliar market in-
stitutions. They tend to prefer to rely on the management methods with which they
are familiar, such as size and gear restrictions. In addition, some simply believe it is
wrong to allow a market to determine who can fish and the quantity of fish any one
1 The seven countries are Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Namibia, the Netherlands, and New
Zealand. In addition, at least five other countries (Greenland, Mexico, Mozambique, Portugal, and the
United States) use ITQs in some of their fisheries; and other important fishing countries, such as Argen-
tina, Morocco, and Peru are planning to introduce ITQs in some of their fisheries.A Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Allowances 3
individual can catch; wrong to ‘privatize’ our public resources; and wrong to allow
some fishers to reap windfall profits from initial quota allocations (Macinko and
Bromley 2002).
These concerns about the effects of ITQs have resulted in programs that place
several restrictions on transferability. Arnason (2002) notes that there are restric-
tions on both quota trades and quota holdings. Trades commonly are restricted by
setting a minimum or maximum volume of the quota traded, restricting times when
trades may be made, and allowing trades only among specific subgroups of the fish-
ery. Holdings commonly are restricted by who can hold quota and how much can be
owned by any one party.
The concerns about the effects of ITQs prompted the US Congress to include in
the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act a moratorium on the introduction of new ITQ
programs. The moratorium lasted six years and expired in the fall of 2003. Recent
reports by the National Research Council (NRC 1999) and the Pew Oceans Commis-
sion (2003) have encouraged many managers and stakeholders to consider making
tradable allowances part of their management programs. They are hoping that ITQs
and other types of tradable allowance programs can be designed to address a wide
range of fishery-specific social and economic objectives.
Since the extent to which these objectives can be achieved varies from fishery
to fishery, it is common for regional management bodies to have responsibility for
designing new tradable allowance systems. Unfortunately, these regional manage-
ment  bodies  have  little  experience—and  less  systematic  analysis  of  those
experiences—on which to draw when designing new trading institutions. First, there
is limited experience worldwide with tradable allowance programs, and second,
there is little variation in the institutional designs of tradable allowance programs, as
programs within and across countries share many basic design features.
One way to inform the design of tradable rights systems is through controlled
economic experiments, in which human subjects play the role of fishers in a simu-
lated environment that represents the key incentives of alternative allowance trading
institutions. By comparing institutions in the laboratory, they can be evaluated for
the degree to which they achieve management program objectives, and flaws can be
identified and addressed before serious or irreversible consequences arise in the
field. Laboratory testbedding, which has proven useful in developing high-value
centralized auctions, like those used by the FCC to sell spectrum rights, and in de-
signing tradable rights systems for water use and pollution emissions can be a vital
tool for designing these new institutions. Implementing rules of regulation, enforce-
ment, and trade in the laboratory will allow policymakers to compare—at relatively
low cost—the complex interactions of incentives and disequilibrium properties that
are not well understood theoretically.
We demonstrate an application of laboratory testbedding to tradable allowance
fishery management, using the Rhode Island inshore lobster fishery as the context
for the study. In 2001, a group of Rhode Island lobstermen and fishery managers
considered applying a tradable trap program to the southern New England American
lobster fishery (modeled on the tradable trap certificate program in the Florida spiny
lobster fishery). The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, which manages
American lobster in northeastern US, recently approved a version of the tradable
trap program for the fishery. The details of the trap trading arrangements have not
yet been determined. Our research efforts are aimed to inform managers on how to
design the market institution for this program.
The next section of the paper provides some background on previous applica-
tions of experimental methods to policy analysis. We then present the general equi-
librium model of tradable allowance systems on which our experimental hypotheses
are based. This is followed by a description of the laboratory representation of aAnderson and Sutinen 4
common allowance trading institution that we used to test our primary hypothesis,
that allowance trading achieves stable, predictable equilibrium prices and the corre-
sponding efficient allocations of fishing effort. The results presented are not sup-
portive of this hypothesis, instead reflecting a high degree of price variance and
showing prominent features of disequilibrium trading in other experimental asset
markets. Many of these features are consistent with field data on tradable allowance
prices. Because experimental techniques allow knowledge of the equilibrium value
of allowances, we can determine that this price variance facilitates formation of a
price bubble and significantly inhibits price convergence and efficiency. We con-
clude with a discussion of modifications to our tested institution, which mirrors
prominent features of field institutions, which might improve initial and long-term
outcomes.
Use of Experimental Methods in Policy Analysis
Experimental economics can contribute to the analysis of market-based policies in
two ways. First, it can provide a carefully controlled test of a theoretical model.
Many of the reasons cited for using tradable allowances rely on the ability of the
market to accurately price allowances. When the market price is based on supply
and demand derived from the marginal profit an additional allowance unit provides
fishers, the post-trading allocation of allowances maximizes the profitability of the
fishery. In addition, allowance costs can be covered with earnings from the addi-
tional allowances, and price changes will be predictable based on expected changes
in the stock, harvesting costs, and market demand. However, realizing these effi-
cient allocations requires equilibration. An empirical question that can be addressed
in the laboratory is whether quota markets equilibrate, or instead exhibit unstable or
non-equilibrium tendencies that are due to features of the underlying derived de-
mand functions, the asset-like properties of permanent quota, or particular rules of
trade which facilitate speculation or other disequilibrium behavior.
A second way experimental techniques can contribute to analyzing market-
based policies is by comparing different ways of structuring the market (Plott 1994;
1997). While we might accept an equilibrium theory as true if predicted outcomes
eventually obtain, the convergence process—about which very little is known theo-
retically—has important policy consequences (Banks et al. 2003). Different
definitions of the property right, rules for trading it, and complementary institutions
affect the speed and nature of price discovery, and thus ultimately determine the out-
come. When theory offers little guidance, experiments can be used to testbed trading
institutions or evaluate the merits of alternative trading policy proposals to deter-
mine those that appear best suited for a particular application. Flaws in proposed
designs can be uncovered and corrected before implementation in the field, where
such adjustments may be impossible or require much greater expense.
Experimental testbedding has been successful in a number of high-profile, high-
value applications which are closely related to tradable allowances, including the
auction NASA uses to determine space shuttle payload priorities (Ledyard, Porter,
and Wessen 2000) and the auction the FCC has used raise more than $9 billion sell-
ing licenses to bandwidth used by cellular telephones (Banks et al. 2003; Salant
2000; Plott 1997). Cellular licenses are challenging to auction efficiently because
there are complementarities in owning adjacent licenses; owning both south and
central Florida is more valuable than the sum of owning just south and just central,
because fees do not need to be paid to the owner of the other to carry calls to the
other zone. In a sequential auction, bidders on south Florida would need to adjust
their price strategically, not knowing whether they would be able to afford centralA Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Allowances 5
Florida, auctioned later. Experiments helped design an auction institution that im-
proves efficiency and maximizes revenue by allowing participants to bid on all licenses
simultaneously, so the synergies of owning adjacent licenses can be priced in the
auction. Experiments also addressed practical questions about the efficiency impacts
of minimum bid increments, which considerably speed this complex auction.
Most closely related to tradable fishing allowances are a number of applications
in water rights trading (e.g., Murphy et al. 2000; Murphy et al. 2003; Cummings,
Holt, and Laury 2004), and tradable pollution rights (Franciosi et al. 1993) (see
Shogren and Hurley 1999 for a survey). Specific cases include the market mecha-
nism for trading sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide in southern California (Ishikida et al.
2000; Carlson et al. 1993) and that used by the Environmental Protection Agency to
trade pollution permits for sulfur dioxide under the Clean Air Act (Cason 1995; Cason
and Plott 1996). In the latter case, the EPA implemented a discriminative auction for
trading permits in which buyers and sellers each submit sealed bids and low-asking
sellers were matched with high-bidding buyers; buyers paid their bid price to their
matched sellers. Experiments demonstrated that this institution’s incentives led sell-
ers to underreport the true costs of emissions control in hopes of being matched with
lower-bidding buyers, resulting in inefficient trades. These experimental results sub-
sequently led to a change in the auction design for pollution permits. This is an
example of how investing in laboratory testbed research before implementing a
rights-trading system can improve the outcomes of tradable allowance markets.
A General Equilibrium Model of Tradable Allowances
Whether it is optimal for each fisher to buy or sell allowances depends on the price,
suggesting it is easiest to think about allowance trading in a general equilibrium
framework. Consider a fishery of i = {1,…,I} fishers. Each fisher has nonnegative
amounts of two goods; allowances, xi; and numeraire, mi. Each fisher has an endow-
ment of allowances, wxi, and an endowment of a numeraire good, wmi. He earns a
profit from fishing, pi(xi), based on the quantity of allowances he holds. In a fishery
in steady state, the fisher’s problem is to select a level of allowances, xi, which
maximizes his total utility from fishing and holding the numeraire:
Maxxi U = pi(xi) + mi
s.t. p · xi + mi =p · wxi + wmi,
where pi(xi) is the monetized profit the fisher earns from fishing with xi allowance
units. We allow the profit functions to vary from fisher to fisher based on skill, the
cost structure of each operation, individual discount rates, and the utility from fishing.
We impose the restriction that the profit function is convex from below, ¶pi(xi)/¶xi > 0
and ¶2pi(xi)/¶xi
2 £ 0.






This induces a demand function, xi(p), which indicates xi
* for all prices, and an ex-
cess demand function zi(p) = xi(p) – wxi, which indicates the quantity of allowances
demanded in excess of endowment; negative values indicate a willingness to supply
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A Walrasian equilibrium of this economy is a nonnegative price for allowances
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If the regulatory input or output restriction is binding, p* will be strictly positive. This is
an equilibrium in the sense that at the given price, no fisher wishes to sell another allow-
ance unit, for it would cost more than p* in foregone profit, and no fisher wishes to
purchase another allowances unit, for it would gain less than p* in additional profit.
This equilibrium has two properties that are often cited as reasons to use a mar-
ket to allocate allowances. First, the First Welfare Theorem implies that no Pareto
improvements are possible, which means that allowances will be traded from fishers
who value them less to the fishers who value them more, maximizing the profit value of
landed catch. Second, equilibrium prices are tied to a fundamental value, the marginal
profit-value of the additional harvest they provide to the marginal purchaser. This means
that any changes in allowance prices should reflect changes in the cost structure of the
fishery, stock health, and the market price for landings rather than fluctuate without
apparent cause. Therefore, prices should be predictable given the state of the fishery,
and there should be few opportunities for market speculation.2
Hypotheses
The hypothesis to be tested is that the prices and allocations predicted by the general
equilibrium model obtain. That the experiment is testing a model is significant be-
cause economic theory provides the key to the generalizability of the results: testing
the predictions of a model implies the results of the experiment will extend to other
situations that can be represented by the same model.
There are at least two alternative hypotheses which may help explain deviations
from equilibrium. The first is price discovery failure. While markets are generally
good at converging to equilibrium prices, equilibrium need not always obtain. Inelastic
supply and demand curves allow a wide range of prices at which mutually profitable
trades can take place. In this environment where supply and demand curves are
based on profit functions with decreasing marginal returns, each buyer must first
purchase his highest-value unit from a seller, who must first sell his lowest value
unit. Therefore, early prices may range widely and result in slow price discovery.
A second reason outcomes may deviate from equilibrium is speculative bubbles.
Because an allowance is an asset which can be bought and sold in each period, when
deciding whether to purchase allowances, a fisher may consider her beliefs about
what others will pay for it in the future, as well as the profit from fishing which can
be obtained with the additional allowances. In experimental markets where assets
pay a random dividend at the end of each period, bubbles—in which prices exceed
the expected total dividend, and even the maximum possible total dividend—have
been widely and consistently observed (e.g., Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988;
Fisher and Kelly 2000; see Sunder 1995 for a survey). If many people believe others
will pay a high price in the future, they may bid up the price of allowances.3 The
2 The model is stated and tested with perfect information. In the field, market participants have imper-
fect and asymmetric information about stock levels, harvesting costs, and future market demand. How-
ever, if equilibrium outcomes do not obtain with perfect information, there is little chance the model
will apply in the more complex field environment.
3 Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) show that bubbles occur even when resale is prohibited, suggesting that
bubbles may occur for reasons other than speculation.A Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Allowances 7
likelihood of such bubbles may increase when higher-than-equilibrium prices ob-
served in the high-variance early stages of price discovery reinforce the belief that
others will be willing to pay high prices in the future.
Experimental Design
To test whether the general equilibrium predictions obtain, we use a controlled labo-
ratory experiment in which subjects play the role of fishers in a tradable allowance
market modeled on trading rules commonly used in the field. In the experiment,
subjects trade in a market for allowances, and their profit from fishing is determined
by the quantity of allowances they hold. At any available market price for allow-
ances, they must decide whether to buy more allowances and fish more, sell some
allowances and fish less, or fish their current holdings of allowances. As in a natu-
rally occurring fishery with an allowance market, subjects who better balance
fishing and trading allowances to maximize their total profit from both activities
earn more profit in the experiment and are paid more money for participating.
A round of the experiment consists of four periods, or fishing years. At the be-
ginning of the round, subjects are endowed with a quantity of allowances and cash.
Each period has two parts, a trading phase and a fishing phase. During the trading
phase, the market opens for subjects to trade allowances with one another. The first
trading period of each round is five minutes long, the second period is four minutes
long, and the third and fourth are three minutes long. After the trading market
closes, subjects earn profit from fishing. Profit is determined from a table based on
the amount of allowances the subject holds after trading. Four periods have been
shown to be sufficient time for markets to converge (Davis and Holt 1993; Smith
and Williams 1983). Each experimental session consists of three rounds, where ini-
tial endowments are restored between rounds, so subjects may repeat the exercise
with the benefit of experience, and we may assess how experience affects outcomes.
Allowances are structured as an asset which provides the opportunity to earn
profit in each period until the end of the round. Allowances purchased in the first of four
periods provide profit in each of the four periods, while allowances purchased in the last
period provide profit only in the final period. Therefore, the predicted equilibrium price
of allowances decreases from period to period by the amount of profit the inframar-
ginal demander earns from holding the marginal allowance unit in one period.
The allowance market is structured as a double auction, in which any fisher can
make both buy and sell offers in the market. The market consists of a centralized
price board (the “Current Market” in figure 1) which lists the prices at which buyers
are willing to buy and sellers are willing to sell. At any time, a subject can buy (sell)
by accepting the best lowest sell (highest buy) price advertised. If he does not like
the best prices advertised, he can also advertise his own price buy (sell) price and
quantity through the market, hoping someone will accept it. Once an offered price is
accepted, the trade is immediately executed at that price, so different trades can take
place at different prices.
The double auction is a robust market institution originally developed to address
shortcomings of decentralized bilateral markets (Chamberlain 1948; Smith 1962).4
4 Most allowance systems use a decentralized auction, where participants may trade at different prices
but price information is imperfectly distributed. This system closely resembles Chamberlain’s (1948)
market experiments, where competitive equilibrium did not obtain. The primary features of the field
market we are replicating are the opportunity for different trades to take place at different prices and the
opportunity for resale. To the extent that the double auction is more centralized than many field institu-
tions, it biases our results toward price convergence.Anderson and Sutinen 8
Since then, it has been widely used in experiments in single markets (see Kagel
1995 for a survey), multiple-market systems (e.g., Noussair, Plott, and Reizman
1995; Anderson et al. 2004), and asset markets (e.g., Smith, Suchanek, and Williams
1988). In standard commodity markets, its convergence properties are so well estab-
lished that it is frequently used to teach undergraduates about competitive
equilibrium theory (Bergstrom and Miller 1999).
Subjects earn profit from fishing based on the amount of allowances they hold
when the market closes. Profit functions are presented to subjects both as a graph of
the period-profit function, shown in the lower-left of figure 1, and as a table, in the
lower right of figure 1. For each number of allowance units, the table shows the sub-
ject her total profit for the period; the marginal profit provided by the last allowance
unit; the total profit (from fishing) if she holds exactly that quantity of allowances at
the end of each period remaining in the round; and the marginal total profit provided
by the last allowance unit. This is the least she should be willing to accept to sell
one unit; the marginal total profit in the next row is the most she should be willing
to pay to purchase another allowance unit.
The profit functions are based on those of medium-large operators in the Rhode
Island inshore lobster fleet, derived from 2001 logbook data (collected by the RI
Department of Environmental Management). The medium-large classification is a
cluster of 33 licenses landing an average of 14,950 pounds per year, fishing 90 days
a year at an average of 236 hauls per day. They average 1.68 crew members (includ-
Figure 1.  Subject’s Experimental Software InterfaceA Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Allowances 9
ing the captain), and soak for a median of 6.45 days.5 For this group, we estimated
an annual production function and multiplied it by the average ex-vessel price
($4.15) to obtain annual revenues.6 We obtained variable and fixed cost estimates
from local lobstermen assisting with the project.7 Convexity is achieved by assum-
ing that a larger number of traps increases soak time, which increases bait cost and
decreases per-trap productivity. This profit function treats the market for catch as
exogenous, eliminating a task that would otherwise have to be explained to subjects.
It also simplifies the subjects’ task by reducing the number of production variables
(e.g., different input costs) that would need to be explained, while still capturing the
incentives represented in those costs.
In this experiment, the profit function of each of 14 subjects (12 in session E) is
maximized at 67 allowance units, with a per-period profit of 440 experimental dol-
lars. The total allocation of allowances among the 14 subjects is 770 units. Subjects
were endowed with either 62 allowance units and 80 cash units (expected net sell-
ers) or 48 allowance units and 400 cash units (expected net buyers). With these
endowments, the allowance market equilibrium is for each subject to hold 55 allow-
ance units and the market price to be between 41 and 46 experimental dollars in the
first period.8
To simplify the design of initial experiments, and especially to reduce the com-
plexity of the subjects’ problem, this profit function is assumed to be the same in
every period. This is equivalent to assuming the fishery is in steady state, and that
the total allocation of allowances is such that recruitment exactly offsets harvest and
mortality. Although few managed fisheries are in steady state, if the equilibrium of
the tradable allowance model fails to obtain in this simpler environment, there is
little hope it will be useful with a dynamic or stochastic stock.9 A steady-state stock
5 Using a cluster analysis based on landings, hauls per day, days fished per year, crew, set time, and total
traps fished, we classified the 287 licenses active in Area 2 during 2001 into five categories: Large (18
licenses), landing an average of 27,104 pounds per year; Medium-large (33 licenses), landing 14,950
pounds; Medium (18 licenses), landing 8,169 pounds; Medium-small (44 licenses), landing 3,600
pounds; and Small (174 licenses), landing 464 pounds. We will use this data for subsequent experiments
with heterogeneous fishers representative of the local fishery.
6 The production function is of the form:
Landings = Days Fished * [Constant * (Traps)b].
The Constant was estimated to be 0.609 and the exponent b to be 0.7931.
7 Since these are the estimates of a few lobstermen, the cost parameters are not necessarily
representative of the industry. We note, however, that the experiment is testing hypotheses of the model
described in the previous section, which makes only very general restrictions on the profit function.
Therefore, the hypothesis tests are meaningful even if this unscientific parameter benchmarking is
inaccurate; the calibration is illustrative only.
8 With discrete-unit supply and demand curves, we must select between a price tunnel (multiple equilib-
rium prices) and a quantity tunnel (multiple equilibrium quantities). In experiments with quantity tun-
nels, trading commissions are often offered to provide incentive to make the inframarginal trade at the
equilibrium price. In environments where resale is allowed, commissions cannot be offered, so we
elected to use a price tunnel, where the market provides the incentive to trade the inframarginal unit.
9 Previous experiments on repeated common pool resources with contemporaneous externalities have
broadly supported rent dissipation models (e.g., Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom 1990; see Ledyard 1995
for a survey). The effects of simple management measures in the contemporaneous externality game are
examined in Walker et al. (2000). Moxnes (1998b) examines the behavior of different subject pools, in-
cluding fishermen, in an unmanaged contemporaneous externality game. Walker and Gardner (1992) add
a dynamic element by tying the probability of repetition to the level of resource remaining at the end of
each stage-game, and find similar results. Moore, Gardner, and Walker (1998) and Gardner, Moore, and
Walker (1997) study a dynamic resource problem with intertemporal externalities. In these experiments,
subjects allocate effort to harvest a common pool resource in each of several periods. At the end of each
period, the remaining resource reproduces itself before the subjects’ next period harvest decision. As in
the naturally occurring fishery, without regulation, subjects tend to overexploit the laboratory common
pool resource. Hey, Neugebauer, and Sadrieh (2001) examine a sole-owner fishery.Anderson and Sutinen 10
also controls for systematic errors in perception of dynamic problems which lead to
inefficient resource exploitation (Hey, Neugebauer, and Sadrieh 2001; Moxnes
1998a).
Although explained here in a fisheries context, the task was presented to sub-
jects in neutral terms, consistent with standard experimental practice. Subjects
traded “permits” to produce “bings” (a “fictitious product”), from which they earned
profit in each period. This decontextualization is necessary because the external va-
lidity of the experiment relies on subjects “playing the role” of fishers, given the
preferences induced by the experimenters. Participants who better respond to these
induced preferences are paid more, in cash, at the end of the experiment for their
participation (Smith 1976; Davis and Holt 1993). It is axiomatic in economics that
people make decisions that maximize their utility, and since money earned in the
laboratory can be used to increase utility outside the lab, participants will make de-
cisions during the experiment that earn them the most money. If the incentives of the
economic environment being simulated have been properly represented in the ex-
periment, then participants acting to maximize their laboratory earnings will make
the same decisions as agents trying to maximize their utilities in the natural environ-
ment. However, if the induced preferences are colored by, or replaced by, an
individual’s own preferences, experimental control is lost. Such a loss of control
might result in principled responses that provide neither an accurate test of the
model (because subjects are not responding to presented incentives) nor an accurate
prediction of the outcome in the naturally occurring environment being modeled
(because experimental payoffs are not scaled so that subjects may trade off their
monetary and non-monetary preferences).
For an experimental session, subjects were recruited to appear at the Policy
Simulation Laboratory at an appointed time. They were told they would receive a
five dollar participation fee, and would have the opportunity to earn “considerably
more” during the experiment. If there were extra subjects (we designed the experi-
ment to accommodate 10, 12, or 14 subjects), volunteers, then randomly selected
subjects, were paid their participation fee and dismissed. After signing consent
forms, subjects were shown into the laboratory and seated at individual computer
terminals, with barriers to discourage talking and impair visibility of others’ termi-
nals. The experimenter then read aloud the instructions (available from the authors)
as subjects followed along on their computer screens, explained how to use the ex-
perimental software, and led subjects through a two-period practice round. After
answering any questions, the experiment began. Following the experiment, subjects’
earnings were converted to US dollars and they were paid privately as they left the
lab. Earnings averaged $23.82 with a standard deviation of $3.95 (range of $6.25 to
$32.50) for sessions which lasted approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes each.
Although this experiment was designed to achieve a high scientific standard, the
policy objectives influenced some design decisions. First, the initial endowments
and profit functions lead to a high level of initial efficiency (the endowment is 94%
efficient). These functions and endowments were chosen to mirror the fishery, to
help fishers and policymakers relate the results of the experiments to the field; while
experimental economists might devise a much lower efficiency endowment to gener-
ate a stronger test of equilibration, the stronger result would be more difficult for its
intended audience to interpret. Second, experimental economists might add more
rounds, possibly even bringing back experienced subjects for a second or third ses-
sion, to determine whether additional experience leads to equilibrium. However,
from a policy perspective, this treatment is uninteresting: in the field, there is only
one round, so one objective of the experimental testbed is to identify an institution
which performs well the first time. Third, experimentalists may also argue that the
allowance should have a longer life to be more directly comparable to previous ex-A Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Allowances 11
periments, many of which use 15-period assets. With shorter-lived allowances, we
can still effectively test the hypothesis that observed allowance prices equal funda-
mental values while determining the effect of limited experience with and training
on the market institution.
Subjects
Subjects in our experiments were undergraduate students at the University of Rhode
Island, recruited from a variety of courses in the College of the Environment and
Life Sciences and from a list of students who had participated in previous unrelated
experiments. Experimentalists’ use of undergraduate student subjects is ultimately a
practical consideration, as undergraduates are available by the thousands at most ex-
perimental labs, are computer literate, and are willing to participate and make
considered decisions for relatively small average payments, making possible collec-
tion of statistically valid samples within budgets that funding agencies are willing to
supply. Using such a specific subset of the population is not considered to bias re-
sults because most experiments do not measure preferences, but rather assess what
happens in complex systems when people respond to induced preferences. Since any
individual would attempt to maximize their earnings given the induced preferences,
the argument goes, no subject population is preferred over any other, since all will
respond to the same incentives in the same way.
In policy experiments, however, it is often thought that subjects who are expert
in the naturally occurring institutions being modeled might behave differently from
properly incentivized non-expert subjects (usually students); therefore, such expert
subjects are a preferred subject pool. The common intuition is that experts have
well-developed strategies which differ from those of inexperienced subjects that en-
able them to better respond, or more realistically respond, to the incentives
provided. However, expert subjects may have developed habits rather than strate-
gies, and thus not be responsive to features of the experimental environment—such
as the potential policies being evaluated—which differ from those presently used.
The scale of experimental payoffs may not be sufficient to motivate reevaluating a
habitual response in the same way as would a change in the natural environment. In
addition, in policy experiments in particular, expert subjects may have opinions
about the best policy and may attempt to manipulate the experimental outcome to
provide evidence for their position, forgoing some experimental earnings in hopes of
a favorable policy. These reasons suggest the opposite intuition, that inexperienced,
disinterested non-expert subjects will have greater external validity than a pool of
experts.
Based both on previous research and features of our experiment, we expect
there would be little systematic difference between fisher and student subject pools
attributable to fisher experience. An experiment by Moxnes (1998b) found no differ-
ences in the behavior of Norwegian cod fishers, fisheries managers, and non-experts
in managing a single-owner laboratory fish stock.10 In addition, neither subject pool
has significant experience with centralized auction markets. Smith, Suchanek, and
Williams (1988) found little difference between student and professional bond trader
subjects in laboratory asset markets. However, whether, how, and why fisher sub-
jects may differ from students subjects is an interesting avenue for future research.
10 Cardenas (2003) documents a relationship between Columbian rural villagers’ behavior in a forestry-
based common pool resource experiment and their degree of dependence on the forest surrounding the
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Results
Figure 2 shows the time series of trade prices from one of our five experimental ses-
sions, designated A through E. The heavy vertical lines divide the rounds, and the
lighter vertical lines indicate periods. The width of each period’s band represents the
number of trades that were executed during that period. The thin horizontal lines
forming a step function within each round indicate the upper bound of the predicted
equilibrium price. Within each round, the equilibrium price of allowances decreases
because there are fewer periods remaining in which to earn profit from fishing with
them. The gray line connects consecutive contract prices.
The time series reveals several phenomena which indicate the market may not
be functioning well. First, there is a tremendous amount of price variance, especially
in the first round. Throughout the first period, some subjects are selling for prices below
20, while other are buying at prices above 60, in some cases in (nearly) consecutive
trades. While some of this spread may be the result of subjects’ focusing too intently on
only one side of the market, it presents significant arbitrage opportunities that should
inspire corrective action and reduce variance quickly. Instead, this variance establishes a
precedent for being able to sell at high prices and buy at low prices, affecting sub-
jects’ beliefs about the prices at which they should trade, hampering convergence.
Worse, it may support price bubbles as subjects demand units for resale, expecting
to be able to resell them at prices like those observed in initial trading.
Second, trading volume is very high. The minimum number of trades necessary in
each round to achieve equilibrium is 49 (42 in session E), in which each of seven (six in
session E) prospective buyers buys seven units. Because profit functions do not change
between periods, these trades should all occur in the first period, and there need not be
any trades in the other periods. In figure 2, there were a total of 927 units traded; in each
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round, there were more than five times the minimum number of transactions necessary
to achieve an efficient allocation. This volume of trading suggests that trades are not be-
ing driven only by differences in the value of allowances between the buyer and seller,
and that prices may, therefore, not reflect fundamental values.11
Third, prices within rounds do not decrease across periods as the fundamental
value of the allowance asset falls. Instead, average prices stay roughly the same—or
even increase—between periods 1 and 2, decrease less than the fundamental value
between periods 2 and 3, and decrease more than the fundamental value between pe-
riods 3 and 4. Since prices are not reflecting or moving with fundamental value, the
market may not achieve its promised efficiency levels.
The following sections more formally characterize the patterns observed in fig-
ure 2 across all five experimental sessions. In general, high price variance and high
volume dominate the early rounds of trading. Average prices are higher than pre-
dicted in equilibrium in all rounds, suggesting trade is not based only on differences
in fundamental value between buyers and sellers. Together, these factors lead to a
reduction in economic efficiency over the initial allocation.
Average Prices
Patterns in the prices, especially across periods, are most easily seen by examining
trends in each period’s average price. Figure 3 graphs the average contract price of
allowances in each period of each round for each experimental session.12 The dashed
11 Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) find that a second, “distractor” market reduces excess volume and helps
suppress bubbles, but this does not explain why “boredom trading” occurs at disequilibrium prices.
12 Due to a software glitch, the third period of round one of session C was zero seconds long.
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line represents the predicted equilibrium price. The across-session variation is
smaller in later rounds, suggesting learning about the process or others’ price expec-
tations occurs with repetition. The feature of primary interest, the price levels in
each period, exhibit a consistent pattern within each round. Except perhaps in round
1, where there is considerable variance, first period prices are near the equilibrium
level. In the second period, they remain approximately level or increase, as the pre-
dicted equilibrium price falls away. In the third period, prices fall, but more slowly
than the fundamental value, increasing the distance between equilibrium and ob-
served prices. In the fourth period, prices again fall, faster than the fundamental
value, but not enough to reach equilibrium.
The dominant feature of the data in figure 3 is that average prices are higher
than their predicted equilibrium values. Table 1 presents the median allowance trade
price in each period, along with a sign test that the median price is greater than the
predicted equilibrium. The pattern in prices across periods is consistent across
rounds. In the first period, prices are at or slightly below the upper bound of the
equilibrium price tunnel of $46. Except in session A round 1 and session E rounds 1
and 2, first period median prices are not significantly different than equilibrium at
conventional levels. After the first period, however, the median trade price in every
period of every session is significantly higher than the predicted equilibrium value,
with p-values of 0.016 or better.
This pattern of below- or at-equilibrium prices in the first period leading to
above-equilibrium prices in subsequent periods is consistent with the price paths ob-
served in other experimental asset markets (e.g., Smith, Suchanek, and Williams
1988; Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2001). Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) charac-
terize price paths in experimental asset markets as “bubbles” when the following are
observed: “(a) prices lower than the fundamental value at the beginning …, (b)
booms …, and (c) crashes in some sessions” (p. 856). Prices in our experimental al-
lowance markets are lower in the beginning, and then experience a boom of higher
than equilibrium prices in later periods.
To understand the extent of the booms and whether or not crashes occur in some
sessions, it is necessary to look at changes in prices between periods. Because the
number of times allowances can be fished before expiring decreases as periods
elapse, the observed market price of allowances should fall by the equilibrium mar-
ginal value of between $10.25 and $11.50 each period. Table 2 presents the change
in average prices between subsequent periods. The overall pattern presented by the
table is summarized in the Overall row, which computes statistics based on aggre-
gated data. Overall changes between periods 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 of each round are
significantly smaller (p < 10–7 or better) than the predicted change. In many ses-
sions, there is very little price change between the first and second periods. In
others, such as sessions A (p < 10–8) and C (p = 0.003) and D (p = 0.007) in round 2,
and A (p < 10–4) and D (p < 10–8) in round 3, there are actually significant increases
in price between the first and second periods. These are consistent with the boom
cycles that are often seen in experimental asset markets.
While prices do not decrease with the fundamental value of the asset, there is a
consistent pattern of decrease in the final period of each round. In the first two
rounds, the average decrease is not significantly different from the equilibrium pre-
diction of –$11.50, but in round 3, it becomes statistically larger than equilibrium
predicts. Considering the decreases session-by-session, there are decreases in price
larger than the change in fundamental value in sessions A (p < 10–9) and E (p =
0.066) in round 2 and in all but session B in round 3. These significant decreases
represent the “crashes” observed by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) and Smith,
Suchanek, and Williams (1988). In each case, the price in the previous period is sig-
nificantly higher than the equilibrium value, so crashes represent markets correctingA Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Allowances 15Anderson and Sutinen 16
toward fundamental value, perhaps due to the absence of future opportunity to re-
sell.
It is notable that we do not observe strong crashing behavior in the first round,
whereas most previous experiments with inexperienced subjects observe strong
crashing. This could be because the life of allowances is only four periods, much
shorter than the fifteen period assets used in other designs. With only four periods in
which to gain experience with the market, it is possible that—despite instructions
and a demonstration round—not all subjects were comfortable enough with the mar-
ket dynamics to identify that the only value of allowances purchased in the last
period of a round is that of the marginal profit from holding an additional unit of
allowances. Alternatively, in many rounds, the within-period standard deviation of
contract prices is larger than the single-period change in fundamental value. Price
variance of this scale could prevent subjects from effectively observing how prices
change from one period to the next.
Volume and Price Variance
That period-average prices do not respond to changes in the fundamental value of
allowances is symptomatic of price discovery difficulties which can be better under-
stood by examining the dynamic of within-period trades. In equilibrium, each net
buyer-net seller pair should exchange 7 units, leading to an equilibrium volume of
49 trades in the first period of each round in all but session E, where 42 trades are
predicted. Table 3 shows the number of trades that occurred in each period of each
round. In all but four of the 15 first periods (session A rounds 1 and 3 and session C
rounds 2 and 3), the number of trades exceeds that predicted by equilibrium. The
critical value for rejecting the hypothesis that the observed number of trades is gen-
erated from a Poisson distribution with a mean of 49 at the 5% level is 61 (53 for a
mean of 42), so in 11 of the 15 first periods, the number of trades is significantly
Table 2
Change in Average Prices between Periods
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
1–2 2–3 3–4 1–2 2–3 3–4 1–2 2–3 3–4
A 0.7 0.8 –17.8 16.9 –19.3 –22.3 7.9 –5.4 –20.3
10–5 10–5 0.195 10–11 10–7 10–9 10–8 0.055 0.003
B 1.5 –8.7 –9.3 –1.4 –8.9 –8.1 –3.0 –2.4 –9.9
10–6 0.052 0.079 10–11 10–4 10–4 10–14 0 0.005
C –1.5 18.5 0.1 –13.3 3.8 –1.0 –14.6
0.009 10–4 0.062 0.232 10–6 10–4 0.031
D 7.1 –1.8 –7.5 1.3 –5.1 –11.4 7.6 –8.3 –13.3
0 10–8 0.002 10–16 10–8 0.144 0 0.007 0.018
E –14.5 –2.6 –12.6 –15.7 1.6 –13.2 –3.0 –11.2 –17.7
0.144 10–4 0.071 10–4 10–6 0.066 10–5 0.090 10–5
Overall –1.3 –3.1 –10.1 –1.2 –5.2 –12.5 0.8 –5.0 –14.3
10–11 10–7 0.117 0 10–9 0.171 0 10–15 0.003
Notes: Numbers in italics are two-tailed p-values of Wilcoxon rank-sum test that the difference is equal
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more than would be expected under the equilibrium model. In addition, large num-
bers of trades occur in each period following the first, while equilibrium predicts all
trades should occur in the first period.
Such high volume is supported by subjects’ belief that they can make money by
buying and reselling allowances within periods. This belief is justified by the high
price variances shown in table 4. Although it is difficult to establish a baseline
against which to compare the level of price variance to that in other markets, we can
compare the price variance to observed and predicted changes in prices within this
market. In moving between consecutive periods, the standard deviation of prices ex-
ceeds the corresponding change in the fundamental value of the allowance. The time
series of prices in figure 2 is typical, where, especially in the first round, the range
of prices exceeds the change in running average price level or period-to-period price
level, and, therefore, obscures changes in price. This variance hinders price discov-
ery and supports speculation.
Efficiency
In equilibrium, the market will allocate allowances to those who value them most
and can fish them most profitably, maximizing the surplus from the fishery. How-
ever, the previous analysis suggests that the market had difficulty identifying an
Table 4
Standard Deviation of Trade Prices Observed in Each Period
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
A 13.3 11.5 12.6 18.6 15.8 9.9 12.7 5.9 13.0 6.6 14.5 9.2
B 21.3 13.9 12.8 10.1 9.2 6.2 5.5 7.0 7.4 3.9 6.9 8.0
C 24.7 21.6 — 20.8 19.8 24.1 11.0 7.9 12.0 12.5 15.1 17.3
D 9.5 8.9 8.3 5.5 6.0 7.4 3.2 9.1 9.8 6.8 4.5 6.7
E 16.2 13.2 11.9 9.9 12.4 12.0 17.0 11.2 11.7 12.4 10.5 6.5
Overall 20.6 15.8 15.4 15.5 14.3 12.4 13.3 10.5 12.1 9.9 11.3 10.1
Table 3
Number of Trades Observed in Each Period
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
A 36 30 27 49 70 33 47 27 35 35 31 30
B 69 63 37 86 66 66 70 116 63 112 84 95
C 62 31 — 43 26 14 16 31 24 45 39 38
D 80 63 59 54 78 56 44 53 90 54 34 57
E 74 49 37 52 93 90 90 56 89 63 53 50
Average 64.2 47.2 40.0 56.8 66.6 51.8 53.4 56.6 60.2 61.8 48.2 54.0Anderson and Sutinen 18
equilibrium price during the experiments. Without an accurate price signal, fishers
may not be able to determine their optimal effort levels, and trades may not lead to
an efficient allocation of allowances and fishing effort.
Figure 4 graphs the ratio of realized profit from fishing to the maximum profit
possible (i.e., profit at the equilibrium allocation) across periods in each round. The
dashed horizontal line indicates the efficiency level of the initial endowments; ob-
servations above the line indicate an increase in efficiency due to trading. From the
graph, there is little tendency for efficiency to improve through trading. In only two
observed rounds, session B round 1 and session E round 3, are observed efficiencies
higher than those of the initial allocation in all four periods.
Decreasing efficiency suggests that in many of the observed trades either the
seller sold for less than the marginal profit foregone by selling allowances, or the
buyer bought for more than the marginal profit earned from holding allowances. The
latter is more common because most transaction prices exceed equilibrium values.
In fact, most trades are not mutually beneficial based on the profit functions. Over-
all, only 19.4% of trades were mutually beneficial, with 36.6% of trades benefiting
the buyer and 67.5% of trades benefiting the seller. This pattern further supports
persistent volatility as buyers are willing to pay more than their marginal profit for
allowances in hopes they could resell for more money later.
Discussion
This experiment was designed to test the equilibrium model on which the economic
arguments supporting the use of tradable allowances to manage fisheries are based.
In our environment, with exchange of multi-period allowances taking place through
a double auction that allows different transaction prices, the experimental data devi-
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ate from the prediction of competitive equilibrium in two ways. First, average prices
are systematically higher than the equilibrium price suggested by fundamental
value. Second, large disequilibrium price fluctuations persist in the data. Although
all markets experience disequilibrium trading during price discovery, price discov-
ery in this market is protracted, and the price variance is quite dramatic, swamping
changes in the underlying value of allowances. This price fluctuation demonstrates
that many trades take place for reasons other than differences in marginal harvest
value between the buyer and seller. Therefore, the resulting allocations do not al-
ways improve economic efficiency. Under our experimental conditions, allowance
trading resulted in lower efficiency than if allowance trading had been prohibited.
The implications of our experimental outcome for real tradable allowance mar-
kets depend on how closely the important economic features of our market
correspond to those of real markets. One way to assess this is to look for the promi-
nent features of our laboratory data in trade prices in existing tradable allowance
programs. The dominant feature of our data, a prolonged price discovery character-
ized by widely fluctuating prices, is also the dominant feature of many field
markets. For example, Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr (forthcoming) identify price
dispersion as a prominent feature of the first four years in a 30-species study of the
New Zealand quota management system. During this period, dispersion levels were
close to 30% of the average price level; the level of dispersion over the last five
years is closer to 10%.13 In the Florida spiny lobster fishery, Larkin and Milon
(2000) find price ranges spanning from one to four times the average price in each
of the first five years of the tradable trap certificate program. Thus, while equilib-
rium does not obtain in our experiment, our data replicate prominent features of
field markets, including those which have led to dissatisfaction with tradable allow-
ance systems.
While dispersion is a natural part of price discovery, the high degree of disper-
sion over several periods in laboratory allowance markets, and several years in field
markets, has important policy implications. Even for a fisher who buys or sells al-
lowances only when it increases her profit, prices which are not based on
fundamental values pose significant pitfalls. In a fundamental-revealing market,
price changes are predictable based on changes in demand and the cost of harvest-
ing. In a market not based on fundamentals, price changes are not predictable.
Arbitrary price fluctuations can significantly affect the value of allowance holdings,
which may constitute a significant portion of a fisher’s wealth or retirement savings.
Such fluctuations complicate long-term business and capitalization decisions, in-
cluding the decision to fish at all. In some fisheries, early sellers have found
long-term prices higher than the price at which they sold out, leaving them to regret
selling and too poor to buy back into the fishery. The risk associated with invest-
ment in volatile allowances could also provide an opportunity for consolidation as
larger operators, especially those who are diversified across fisheries, may take on
risk that smaller operators are not willing to accept. Finally, disequilibrium prices do
not reflect the health of the stock, and thus cannot be used as a basis for manage-
ment decisions (Arnason 1990; Batstone and Sharp 2003).
However, these negative initial results do not imply that effective transferable
allowance programs cannot be designed. Many field experiences suggest that allow-
ance market prices eventually become predictable, increasing satisfaction among
participants. For example, Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr (forthcoming) find recent
quota prices in the New Zealand system to be correlated with export prices, indicat-
13 Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr measure dispersion as the ratio of the absolute value of the difference
between a trade’s price and the month’s mean price, and the month’s mean price.Anderson and Sutinen 20
ing a relationship between allowance prices and fundamental value. While our mar-
kets did not converge in the time allotted, our results suggest outcomes could be
improved by expediting price discovery and reducing initial price variance. Al-
though the convergence process is typically ignored in economic analysis, it is
critically important for policy application because many people make significant
business or life decisions based on prices observed during equilibration.
One of the important lessons of past applications of experimental methods to
auctions and market-based management systems is that the economic institutions
used affect outcomes. In particular, different trading rules have different price dis-
covery properties. The design used in this experiment was chosen to reflect the
incentives and institutions of typical established tradable allowance markets. Since
the shortcomings of the tradable allowance field data mirror those in the laboratory,
laboratory work can be directed at exploring alternative institutions that may reduce
price variance and measures for reducing speculative opportunities. The laboratory
is a critical tool in this analysis because, although it is a significant determinant of
outcomes and drives the fear many fishers have of tradable allowance management,
disequilibrium behavior is not well understood theoretically. In the laboratory, alter-
native institutions, proposed to address specific challenges in particular applications
or drawn from experience with other tradable allowance systems, can be assessed
based on economic and social performance measures. Institution “tournaments” can
be used to select and refine sets of rules of trade for different applications before
implementation in the field leads to outcomes which are irreversible or very costly
to restore. With this refined institution, managers and stakeholders will know the
potential of market-based management in their fishery, and can compare expected
outcomes with other forms of management to determine whether the fishery is best
managed by tradable allowances.
Ongoing work is assessing a promising alternative for addressing the high initial
price variance which inhibits price discovery: an “initial lease period” in which only
single-period allowances, not permanent allowances, may be traded in the first peri-
ods (or years) of the program. Phased-in transferability was used in the British
Columbia halibut individual quota program (Casey et al. 1995).14 This feature al-
lows the market to address separately the problems of identifying the market value
of single-year allowances and determining how that value is aggregated over time.
Future work will increase the complexity of the experimental environment to study
whether markets facilitate consolidation among heterogeneous fishers and the ef-
fects of concurrent allowance derivative and lease markets on permanent allowance
markets.
While useful for assessing alternative institutions, future experimental work can
help facilitate effective fishery management in another way. The experimental envi-
ronments developed for scientific investigation can also be used to educate the
fishers themselves about alternative management systems through hands-on work-
shops or training sessions. Although Cummings, Holt, and Laury (2004) invited
farmers to participate in their water auctions, the auction design in theirs and all
other previous applications of experiments was unilaterally determined by the regu-
latory agency. In fisheries, where stakeholder input is highly integrated into the
management process, such simulations have the potential to allay fears, address
questions, or raise new issues during, rather than after, the decision-making process.
14 The BC halibut individual vessel quota began in 1991, and during the first two years, no quota trans-
fers (temporary or permanent) were allowed separate from fishing licenses. After two years, temporary
(annual) transfers were permitted, which remained in effect until about three years ago. Both permanent
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This can improve the management of all fisheries by grounding stakeholder and
manager arguments in information rather than conjecture, helping each fishery se-
lect the best management system for its specific bio- and socioeconomic goals.
When trades take place at or near the market equilibrium price, tradable allow-
ance systems for managing fisheries have many desirable economic properties.
However, in the early periods following the introduction of tradable allowances,
outcomes are significantly influenced by disequilibrium behavior. Therefore, such
systems cannot be implemented indiscriminately and without regard for the price
discovery process. As our experimental data attest, undesirable outcomes can arise
from disequilibrium trading. However, these adverse outcomes do not mean that
transferable allowances cannot work or should not be used. Rather, they pose a chal-
lenge to managers and fisheries economists to identify institutions that facilitate
trade and yield the most desirable outcomes on social and equity as well as eco-
nomic dimensions. If experience in other complex markets is any indication, this
research can drive advances in economic theory and institutional design, and signifi-
cantly enhance the economic and social success of the management programs.
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